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ABSTRACT: Ideology’s crucial theoretical and empirical role in explaining political 
behavior makes it imperative that scholars understand how individuals conceptualize and 
apply ideological labels. The existing literature on this topic is quite limited, however, 
because it relies almost exclusively upon data from the 1970s and 1980s, and it does not 
examine how psychological factors influence conceptualizations of ideological labels. 
This paper uses data from two original laboratory experiments to test the relative impact 
of four major policy dimensions on participants’ evaluations of candidate ideology, and 
to test authoritarianism’s role in shaping ideological conceptualization. These analyses 
indicate that individuals most often define liberalism and conservatism primarily in terms 
of social policies closely associated with religious values, each of which invert traditional 
ideological orientations toward the appropriate size and role of government. The causal 
mechanism shaping this relationship is authoritarianism, because, I argue, the religious 
social policy dimension most clearly evokes the deep-seated value conflicts associated 











A major point of contention in the 2008 Republican Party presidential primary 
concerned which candidate qualified as the “true conservative” in that race. Of the 
candidates, former Arkansas Governor Mike Huckabee and former New York City 
Mayor Rudy Giuliani seem to have been the most and least successful, respectively, at 
convincing primary voters and the media of their conservative bona fides. According to 
exit polling data from the first month of primary competition, January 2008, Huckabee 
won a plurality of self-described “very conservative” voters and Giuliani won a plurality 
of self-described “somewhat liberal” and “moderate” voters.1 Likewise, media portrayals 
of Giuliani typically cast him as an ideological “moderate” or “liberal,”2 while portrayals 
of Huckabee typically cast him as a “conservative,” albeit with some qualifications.3 
Why did primary voters and the media view Huckabee as a conservative, and 
Giuliani as a liberal? I argue in this paper that Americans tend to define ideological labels 
primarily in terms of social policy views. Therefore, I would interpret Huckabee and 
Giuliani’s ideological reputations as consequences of their social conservatism and social 
                                                 
1 Retrieved November 12, 2008, from http://www.msnbc.msn.com/21660890.  
2 For example: “Mr Giuliani is seen as a liberal” (Balogh 2007); “[Giuliani] is vulnerable 
to accusations that he is too liberal for many Republicans” (Spillius 2007); “[Giuliani is 
a] pro-choice, pro-gun control, pro-gay rights moderate” (Saltonstall 2007).  
3 For example: “[Huckabee is] a seemingly novel mix of moral conservatism and 
economic populism” (Grainger 2008); “when it comes to foreign affairs he sometimes 
sounds almost liberal” (Kirkpatrick 2007); “Huckabee is running as a sort of New 
Republican, a self-described conservative who has a history of proposals that some in his 
home state considered moderate or even liberal” (Kranish 2007).  
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liberalism, respectively.  Comparing their stances on the three major policy dimensions – 
economic, foreign, and social policy – supports this interpretation. 
In terms of economic and foreign policy, Giuliani’s conservative credentials never 
were seriously challenged during the primary campaign. In contrast, the Club for Growth 
sponsored television advertisements denouncing Huckabee as a “tax-and-spend-liberal” 
(Conroy 2007) and Republican rival Fred Thompson accused him of espousing “liberal 
foreign policies” and “blaming America first” (Nason 2007).  
Only in terms of social policy did the candidates’ views align with their general 
ideological reputations. Giuliani held moderate to liberal views on a number of core 
social issues, including abortion, gay rights, gun control, and illegal immigration. 
Huckabee, on the other hand, was pro-life, opposed to gay marriage and civil unions, and 
he favored teaching Creationism in public schools. Interestingly, though, many 
conservative elites attacked Huckabee for his stances on social policies not closely 
associated with religious values; they accused him of being soft on crime and illegal 
immigration, and insufficiently opposed to gun control. 
Giuliani, then, was accepted as solidly conservative on two major policy 
dimensions (economic and foreign policy) while Huckabee was accepted as solidly 
conservative only on a subset of one major policy dimension (social policy). That 
Huckabee was reputed to be exceptionally conservative on the whole, and Giuliani 
exceptionally liberal, suggests that social policy most influenced ideological perceptions 
of these candidates. This paper details empirical and theoretical considerations favoring 
such an interpretation, then empirically tests whether, and why, social policy most 
influences individuals’ conceptualizations of ideological labels. 
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Literature 
Despite the American public’s demonstrated lack of ideological sophistication 
(Campbell, Converse, Miller, and Stokes 1960; Converse 1964; Levitin and Miller 1979; 
Lewis-Beck, Jacoby, Norpoth, and Weisberg 2008; Luttbeg and Gant 1984), ideological 
self-identification has proven to be one of the strongest and most consistent predictors of 
political behaviors and attitudes such as vote choice (Jost 2006; Levitin and Miller 1979), 
candidate evaluations (Zaller 1992), and policy preferences (Abramowitz and Saunders 
2008; Jacoby 1991). Additionally, the ideological location of voters and candidates is 
central to spatial theories of voting behavior such as rational choice theory (Downs 1957) 
and the directional theory of issue voting (Rabinowitz and MacDonald 1989). 
Given ideology’s tremendous empirical and theoretical significance for the study 
of political behavior, it is surprising that little scholarly attention has been devoted in 
recent years to understanding how individuals conceptualize ideological labels such as 
“conservative” and “liberal,” and how they come to perceive some candidates as more 
ideologically extreme than others. Indeed, empirical analyses of ideological 
conceptualization are confined almost entirely to several studies from the late 1970s and 
1980s, a political era that preceded recent increases in the public’s awareness of 
ideological concepts and dramatic changes in the national political environment. Also, 
these studies do not analyze how individual-level psychological factors, most notably 
authoritarianism, might influence conceptualizations of ideological labels and perceptions 




Previous Studies of Ideological Conceptualization 
Conover and Feldman (1981), Luttbeg and Gant (1985), and Sanders (1986) analyze 
conceptualizations of ideological labels using open-ended responses to the following 
questions from the 1978 and 1980 American National Election Studies (ANES): 
People have different things in mind when they say someone’s political 
views are liberal or conservative. We’d like to know more about this. Let’s 
start with liberal. What sort of thing do you have in mind when you say 
that someone’s political views are liberal? And, what do you have in mind 
when you say that someone’s political views are conservative? 
Conover and Feldman and Luttbeg and Gant find that ANES respondents most 
often define ideological labels in terms of attitudes toward change; liberals are viewed as 
accepting of change and conservatives are viewed as resistant to change. Sanders, using a 
different coding scheme, classifies the plurality of respondents as defining both 
ideological labels primarily in terms of “General Philosophy.” 
While these studies indicate that individuals usually define ideological labels in 
terms of abstract concepts, they also find that individuals often define ideological labels 
in terms of specific policies and policy dimensions. In terms of policy dimensions, 
Conover and Feldman find that liberals define liberalism and conservatism primarily in 
terms of “recent social issues,” while Luttbeg and Gant and Sanders find that respondents 
define ideological labels primarily in terms of economic policy. 
Conover and Feldman, as well as Sanders, also study more directly the 
relationship between policy dimensions and ideological conceptualization by regressing 
ideological self-identification on policy positions. Conover and Feldman find that 
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respondents’ social policy and economic policy preferences significantly predict 
ideological self-identification, although social policy preferences cease to be significant 
after controlling for liberal and conservative feeling thermometers. Sanders finds that 
social policy preferences best predict ideological self-identification for the plurality of 
respondents who define ideological labels primarily in terms of general philosophy, 
ahead of economic policy preferences and even party identification. Social policy 
preferences also prove to be the strongest predictor of ideological self-identification for 
respondents defining ideological labels primarily in terms of social policy, and they are 
only slightly less predictive than economic policy preferences for respondents defining 
ideological labels primarily in terms of economic policy. 
Only in the last few years have scholars begun to revisit the study of ideological 
conceptualization. Zumbrennen and Gangl (2008) analyze the relative impact of social 
and economic conservatism on conservative self-identification and issue preferences. 
Based on the results of an original survey and the 2004 ANES, they conclude that the 
impact of economic attitudes, measured separately as “limited government conservatism” 
and “market conservatism,” “pales before the powerful role of culturally conservative 
beliefs” in shaping conservative identification (216). However, these results are limited 
by Zumbrunnen and Gangl’s use of abstract attitudes toward government activity, rather 
than actual policy preferences, to predict self-identification among conservatives only.  
Feldman and Johnston’s (2009) study of the dimensionality of ideological self-
identification also sheds valuable light on the topic of ideological conceptualization. 
Using a factor mixture model, Feldman and Johnston find that 45% of 2000 ANES 
respondents base their ideological self-identification primarily on economic and social 
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policy, 33% on social policy, and 22% on economic policy. While highly informative and 
methodologically rigorous, this study tests the effects of only two policy domains, the 
contents of which reflect the limited range of relevant policy preference measures 
available in the ANES, particularly with respect to the social policy dimension. 
There is ample reason to suspect that the perceived meaning of ideological labels 
has changed since the 1970s and 1980s, when the ANES collected data used in the 
studies most directly measuring the relationship between policy dimensions and 
conceptualizations of liberalism and conservatism. Numerous studies indicate that the 
American public has grown increasingly familiar with ideological concepts in recent 
years (e.g. Abramowitz and Saunders 1998; Bennett 1995; Hetherington 2001). At the 
same time, there have been great changes in the content of political debate and the 
public’s approach to interpreting political events, both potentially reshaping public 
conceptualizations of ideological labels. Specifically, the “Culture Wars” (Hunter 1991, 
Layman 2001) that emerged in the late 1980s and 1990s have made social policy a more 
salient feature of political conflict than in previous eras. Also during this time, Americans 
have become increasingly likely to interpret political events in terms of a clash between 
authoritarian and non-authoritarian values (Hetherington and Weiler 2009) – a clash that 
is perhaps most clearly evident in the “Culture Wars” just referenced.  
Social Policy and Ideological Conceptualization 
The possibility that social policy most defines ideological labels is a matter of 
particular interest for this paper. In some ways, social policy would seem exceptionally 
unlikely to define ideological labels. First, social policy is a relatively recent addition to 
the political agenda, in comparison to economic or foreign policy (Carmines and Layman 
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1997; Scammon and Wattenberg 1970). Second, many of the most prominent social 
issues seem to invert traditional ideological orientations toward the appropriate size and 
role of government. Typically, scholars and pundits explain the distinction between 
liberalism and conservatism in terms of liberals’ preference for a larger, more active 
government and conservatives’ preference for a smaller, less active government.4 Yet, in 
the case of the most salient social policies, such as abortion and gay rights, it is 
conservatives who advocate for government regulation and liberals who advocate for 
government restraint. The fact that liberals and conservatives align themselves on these 
issues in contradiction to their traditional principles suggests that ideological distinctions 
are not solely based on attitudes toward the appropriate size and role of government. This 
traditional interpretation of ideological distinctions would be undermined further, perhaps 
fundamentally, by evidence indicating that the social policies least amenable to that 
interpretation most define ideological labels. 
It is important to note, though, that not all issues typically categorized within the 
social policy dimension fit the preceding description. In fact, I argue in this paper that the 
social policy dimension, as conceptualized typically in scholarly research and popular 
discourse, seems to conflate two distinct groups of issues likely to differ in their 
                                                 
4 For example, Stimson, MacKuen, and Erikson (1995) describe their macroideological 
Domestic Policy Mood measure as being “properly interpreted as left versus right – more 
specifically, as global preference for a larger, more active government as opposed to a 
smaller, more passive one across the sphere of all domestic policy controversies (548).” 
Perhaps not surprisingly, then, the Domestic Policy Mood measure fails to capture 
attitudes toward the quintessential social policy: abortion (see their Footnote 14). 
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relevance to ideological meaning. The social policies most commonly cited in the 
relevant literature are abortion and gay rights; every enumeration of social policies I 
encountered in my research included abortion, and gay rights was included nearly as 
often, particularly in more recent works. These issues fit clearly my description of many 
social policies as inverting traditional liberal and conservative preferences for 
government activity. Other issues commonly attributed to the social policy dimension, on 
the other hand, are entirely consistent with traditional liberal and conservative attitudes 
toward the size and role of government. For instance, conservatives tend to prefer 
minimal government intervention, and liberals tend to prefer substantial government 
intervention, when it comes to gun control and Affirmative Action. Interestingly, these 
same social issues also differ in terms of their relevance to the role of religion in public 
life. Opponents of abortion and gay rights, for example, regularly invoke Judeo-Christian 
doctrines as the bases for their positions. The same cannot be said for other social issues 
such as gun control and Affirmative Action.  
Grouping both types of social policy within the same dimension is likely to 
obscure important differences between their effects on ideological conceptualization. A 
major objective of this paper is to test empirically whether individuals perceive the two 
categories of social issues differently in terms of their relevance to ideological 
conceptualization. In doing so, this paper provides valuable insight into the conceptual 
coherence of the social policy dimension, as commonly characterized, and the relative 
impact of different types of social policy on conceptualizations of ideological labels. 
Although it might seem unlikely that social policies – particularly social policies 
closely associated with religious values and inverting traditional ideological orientations 
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toward the appropriate size and role of government – would most define ideological 
labels, there is much evidence in the Political Science literature to suggest that this is the 
case. Numerous empirical studies indicate that social policies are exceptionally amenable 
to ideological conceptualization. First, ideological constraint is greater for social policy 
than for any other policy dimension (Converse and Markus 1979; Lewis-Beck et al. 
2008). Second, individuals recognize liberal and conservative positions on social policies 
more readily than for any other policy dimension (Jacoby 1995; Levitin and Miller 1979). 
Third, self-described liberals and conservatives have proven more polarized on social 
policy than on any other policies (Robinson 1984). Finally, as detailed above, Conover 
and Feldman (1981), Sanders (1986), and Zumbrunnen and Gangl (2008), all find that 
social policy influences ideological definitions more than any other policy dimension.  
Authoritarianism and Ideological Conceptualization 
In addition to measuring the relative influence of various policy dimensions on 
ideological conceptualization, this analysis also seeks to determine why some individuals 
define ideological labels primarily in terms of a given policy dimension. Such analysis is 
lacking in previous studies of ideological conceptualization, and this limits scholars’ 
understanding of individual-level variation in ideological conceptualization and the 
contextual factors influencing more widespread shifts in the public’s interpretation and 
application of ideological labels.  
Recent studies in the political psychology literature point to a critical link between 
ideology and a variety of psychological and personality factors. A number of 
psychological factors have been shown to influence ideological self-identification, 
including those falling under the umbrellas of uncertainty avoidance and threat 
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management (Jost, Glaser, Kruglanski, and Sulloway 2003a; Jost, Glaser, Kruglanski, 
and Sulloway 2003b; Jost, Napier, Thorisdottir, Gosling, Palfai, and Ostafin 2007). 
Scholars also have documented a compelling link between several of the Big Five 
personality traits and ideological identification, in the United States (Carney, Jost, 
Gosling, and Potter 2008; Gerber, Huber, Doherty, Dowling, and Ha 2010) and in Europe 
(Thoridsdottir, Jost, Liviatan, and Shrout 2007).   
Given that psychological and personality factors have been shown to significantly 
influence ideological self-identification, it is quite plausible that such factors also 
influence the ways in which individuals conceptualize and apply ideological labels more 
generally. In this paper, I test the role of authoritarianism in shaping conceptualizations 
and applications of ideological labels. Specifically, I propose that more authoritarian 
individuals are most likely to define ideological labels primarily in terms of the social 
policy dimension, particularly social policies closely associated with religious values.  
Authoritarianism has proven to be one of the most influential concepts in the 
academic literature on personality and political psychology, beginning decades ago with 
the publication of The Authoritarian Personality (Adorno, Frenkel-Brunswik, Levinson, 
and Sanford 1950). Despite its alarming, and often misunderstood, label, authoritarianism 
is quite common in the American public; slightly less than a majority of 2004 ANES 
respondents scored at the two highest levels of authoritarianism, while only a quarter 
scored at its two lowest levels (Hetherington and Weiler 2009). Authoritarianism also has 
a substantial impact on political behavior in the general public; Lavine, Lodge, and 
Freitas (2005) describe authoritarianism as “a core political predisposition, on a par with 
party identification and political ideology as a lens through which the political world is 
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perceived and evaluated” (237). In fact, Hetherington and Weiler, in a recent 
comprehensive study, present impressive evidence that authoritarianism has come to 
structure inter-party conflict in recent years, through a “worldview evolution” similar to 
Carmines and Stimson’s (1989) concept of an issue evolution. Hetherington and Weiler 
demonstrate that authoritarianism, as measured by four child-rearing values included in 
the 1992, 2000, and 2004 ANES, has become a statistically significant predictor of policy 
preferences, party identification, voter turnout, and primary and general election vote 
choice recently, among Republicans and Democrats, alike. 
Much like authoritarianism has been shown to structure other important aspects of 
political behavior and attitudes, I argue in this paper that authoritarianism also 
significantly influences the way in which individuals conceptualize and apply ideological 
labels. In particular, I argue that authoritarians are most likely to conceptualize 
ideological labels primarily in terms of social policies closely associated with religious 
values. Why? First, consider that Hetherington and Weiler explain authoritarianism’s 
impact on political behavior in terms of its implications for resisting new information that 
might challenge preexisting attitudes; authoritarians tend to make political judgments 
based on its implications for a perceived conflict between their values and other 
individuals’ distinct, often threatening, set of values.  Values associated with religiosity, 
or aversion to it, likely constitute the most significant set of preexisting attitudes that 
would cause resistance to new information, since they tend to become deeply engrained 
at an early age and retain great personal significance throughout life. Therefore, issues 
closely associated with religious values should most clearly and strongly evoke a sense of 
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value conflict that would lead authoritarians to define ideological labels, one of the most 
salient means of political demarcation, primarily in terms of such issues. 
Indeed, religiously-themed social issues best exhibit the characteristics associated 
with an authoritarian worldview. Opinions on such issues, particularly abortion, have 
proven to be exceptionally stable, and therefore resistant to new information, over time 
(Adams 1997; Converse and Markus 1979; Goren 2004). Also, researchers regularly 
characterize them as uniquely gut-level issues guided by stable personal values (e.g. 
Adams 1997, 729). What is more, Hetherington and Weiler trace the beginning of the 
authoritarianism-based worldview evolution to the “culture war” controversies of the 
early 1990s that are most commonly associated with religious social policies such as 
abortion and gay rights. Finally, the authoritarianism dimension that these authors 
construct and test, with great predictive success, comprises mostly issues typically 
categorized within the social policy dimension, including civil rights, women’s rights, 
gay rights, and illegal immigration. Thus, it is quite reasonable to suspect that Americans’ 
emerging tendency to see the political world as a contest between authoritarian values, as 
Hetherington and Weiler posit, leads them to define ideology today primarily in terms of 
social policy, and particularly social policy closely associated with religious values.  
To the extent that ideological comprehension has increased in recent years while 
the political environment has undergone significant changes, as indicated by the research 
herein discussed, it seems likely that ideological conceptualizations might have changed 
since the 1970s and 1980s, when the data used in the most influential studies of this topic 
were collected. In order to provide an updated and methodologically diverse contribution 
to this literature, and to evaluate authoritarianism’s role in influencing ideological 
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conceptualization, in this paper I test a series of relevant hypotheses using data from two 
original laboratory experiments. In particular, I seek to determine which policy 
dimension, if any, most influences conceptualizations of liberalism and conservatism, and 
whether authoritarianism significantly influences how individuals use policy dimensions 
to define ideological labels.  
Of course, some scholars would argue that symbolic groups, not issues, truly 
shape ideological meaning (see Conover and Feldman 1981). However, empirical 
evidence and intuition would suggest that policies must shape ideological meaning to 
some considerable degree, and policy dimensions are capable of capturing a 
comprehensive array of substantive and symbolic factors. For instance, evaluations of the 
economic policy dimension are likely to reflect specific policy preferences as well as 
attitudes toward symbolic groups associated with economic policy, including business 
interests, labor unions, and social classes. Thus, while policy dimensions alone do not 
define ideological labels for the mass public, they are certain to contribute substantially to 
ideological conceptualization while also absorbing much of the symbolic content closely 
associated with them. 
Hypotheses and Methodology 
Drawing upon the theoretical and empirical literature discussed above, this paper 
tests four hypotheses. Hypothesis 1 states that the social policy dimension most 
influences conceptualizations of ideological labels. This hypothesis is qualified by 
Hypothesis 2, however, which states that the social policies most influencing ideological 
conceptualization are those closely associated with religious values and inverting 
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traditional ideological orientations toward the size and role of government. Other social 
policies are conceptually distinct and do not tend to shape ideological conceptualizations. 
Additionally, this paper provides an important opportunity to test previous 
findings that different “criterial referents” primarily define liberalism and conservatism 
(Conover and Feldman 1981; Kerlinger 1984). If, in fact, individuals tend to 
conceptualize liberalism and conservatism primarily in terms of different substantive 
considerations, it might be the case that Hypotheses 1 and 2 apply only to 
conceptualizations of liberalism and not conservatism, or vice versa. While quite 
plausible, I see no theoretical basis, prima facie, for hypothesizing that different policy 
dimensions should define one ideological label and not the other. Therefore, Hypothesis 3 
states that the social policy dimension, in particular social policies closely associated with 
religious values, primarily defines liberalism and conservatism. 
Finally, Hypothesis 4 posits a causal mechanism for conceptualizing ideological 
labels primarily in terms of social policy: authoritarianism. Specifically, this hypothesis 
states that, as authoritarianism increases, participants become more likely to define 
ideological labels primarily in terms of the religious social policy dimension.   
I test these four hypotheses using data from two original laboratory experiments. 
My objective in Study 1 is to provide an initial evaluation of the relationship between 
policy dimensions and ideological labeling, and to determine whether ideological 
perceptions differ between candidates associated with religiously-themed social policies 
(e.g. abortion, same-sex marriage, school prayer) and candidates associated with social 
policies that are not religiously-themed (e.g. gun control, illegal immigration, Affirmative 
Action). Study 2 provides a more comprehensive examination of ideological 
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conceptualization, by presenting each participant with candidates representing all four 
policy dimensions – economic, foreign, secular social, and religious social policy – and 
testing those dimensions’ relative influence in defining ideological labels. By eliminating 
the social policy manipulation included in Study 1 and expanding the number of 
participants in this experiment, Study 2 also enables me to test with appropriate statistical 
power the causal influence of authoritarianism in shaping ideological conceptualizations.  
In addition to providing methodological diversity to the heretofore survey-based 
study of ideological conceptualization, an experimental approach is valuable because it 
allows researchers to control participants’ information environment, thereby isolating the 
manipulated variables’ effects and maximizing causal inference. To this end, the 
experiments herein described included stimuli featuring fictional candidates as the targets 
of ideological evaluation, ideological evaluations were obtained at the experiment’s 
outset to avoid possible priming effects, and the information presented to participants was 
held constant across conditions, except for information pertaining to the experimental 
manipulations. Thus, differences in ideological evaluations should be attributable only to 
the experimental manipulations and not to confounding information such as previous 
familiarity with the targets of evaluation or question order effects.   
Experimental Design: Study 1 
 Study 1 presented participants with a hypothetical election scenario featuring 
three fictional candidates competing for a seat in the U.S. House of Representatives. 
Participants were told that each candidate discussed many issues on the campaign trail, 
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but that he tended to emphasize a particular set of issues for which he was known best.5 
Participants then were presented with three policy positions taken by each candidate, 
corresponding in each case to the economic, foreign, or social policy dimension.6 
Study 1 uses a 2 (secular v. religious social policy candidate) x 2 (liberal v. 
conservative candidates) x 6 (order of candidate presentation), between-subjects factorial 
design. The first experimental manipulation is designed to test Hypothesis 2 by randomly 
assigning participants to one of two social policy conditions. For this condition, 
participants read about an election featuring either a candidate emphasizing social 
policies closely associated with religious values (herein called religious social policies), 
or a candidate emphasizing social policies not closely associated with religious values 
(herein called secular social policies). The economic and foreign policy candidates’ 
positions did not vary between social policy conditions.  
                                                 
5 Specifically, participants were told: “Suppose three candidates are running for a seat in 
the United States House of Representatives. The candidates discuss many issues during 
the campaign, but each candidate is known primarily for a specific set of issues that he 
tends to emphasize on the campaign trail. Next you will read about the positions 
emphasized by each of the Congressional candidates. You will then be asked to answer 
some questions related to the candidates and their policy positions.” The exact positions 
attributed to each candidate are provided in this paper’s appendix. 
6 I chose the economic, foreign, and social policy dimensions because they are logically 
distinguishable, capture salient political divisions, and are used throughout the literature 
(e.g. Guth, Kellstedt, Smidt, and Green 2006; Lewis-Beck et al. 2008; Sanders 1986).  
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The second experimental manipulation is designed to test Hypothesis 3 by 
randomly assigning participants to one of two candidate ideology conditions.  The first 
group of participants read about an election featuring three candidates taking liberal 
positions on each policy dimension, while the second group of participants read about an 
election featuring three candidates taking conservative positions on each policy 
dimension. This manipulation enables me to test separately how participants use the 
policy dimensions to define liberalism versus conservatism, based on whether they are 
evaluating the ideologies of three liberal candidates or three conservative candidates. 
The third experimental manipulation is designed to capture potential order effects 
on participants’ evaluations of candidate ideology. To this end, I randomly varied the 
candidate names and the order of presentation associated with each policy dimension. 
With three candidates in each election scenario, there were six possible orders in which 
the candidates could appear. As expected, though, the results of Study 1 do not differ 
significantly as a result of name and order effects. Therefore, I exclude this manipulation 
from subsequent analyses and do not include it in Study 2.  
This experiment’s key methodological challenge was designing measures capable 
of capturing the relative impact of each policy dimension on participants’ 
conceptualizations of liberalism or conservatism. To do this, I directly elicited 
participants’ perceptions of which policy dimension, as embodied by a candidate defined 
entirely in terms of his emphasis on policies contained within a particular dimension, 
represented his ideological category most completely, or to the fullest degree. Since 
participants were presented with either three liberal candidates or three conservative 
candidates, they should have recognized each candidate as fitting his appropriate 
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ideological label to some degree.7 However, if participants defined ideological labels 
primarily in terms of a particular policy dimension, it is reasonable to expect that they 
would have identified the candidate embodying that policy dimension as representing his 
ideological label to a greater degree than the other candidates.8  
Two items included in the experimental questionnaire measured participants’ 
perceptions of the degree to which the candidates represented their ideological labels. 
First, participants were asked to place the candidates on a standard seven-point 
ideological scale; second, participants were asked to choose the most liberal or 
conservative candidate in their particular election scenario.9 I use both measures to 
evaluate perceived candidate ideology in the analyses that follow. 
Why, one might ask, was the ideological scale not sufficient? The reason is that 
participants could – and several, in fact, did – place multiple candidates at the same point 
on the ideological scale. From such responses, it is impossible to determine which, if any, 
candidate participants perceived to be the most ideologically extreme. Of course, it could 
                                                 
7 Indeed, participants placed the individual candidates on the appropriate side of the 
ideological scale 69.3% of the time in Study 1, and 68.3% of the time in Study 2. In both 
studies, then, this manipulation appears to have been largely successful.  
8 For brevity, I refer to the candidate that participants view as fitting his ideological label 
to the greatest degree as the “most ideologically extreme candidate.” This designation 
should be interpreted in terms of the degree to which a candidate represents his 
ideological label, and not as an statement that the candidate is ideologically radical. 
9 The candidate selected as the most liberal (conservative) was coded as the most 
ideologically extreme for participants in the liberal (conservative) candidates condition.  
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have been the case that participants placed candidates at the same point on the ideological 
scale because they perceived them all to be ideologically identical. If so, then the second, 
forced choice, measure should have elicited essentially random responses, with no 
candidate consistently being selected as most extreme. If, however, participants did 
perceive ideological differences across the candidates but failed to indicate this through 
scale placements, then a pattern should have emerged in favor of a particular candidate 
being selected as most ideologically extreme. Indeed, I find a clear pattern of results in 
the forced choice measure that is consistent with that of the scale placement measure. 
Results: Study 1 
One hundred sixteen undergraduate students from [deleted for anonymity] 
University participated in Study 1, in Summer 2008, in exchange for extra credit points in 
a Political Science course. Sixty-one percent of participants were males, 16% were non-
whites, 53% were Republicans, 53% were conservatives, 50% were Political Science 
majors, and ages ranged from 18 to 60 years old (with a mean age of 23).  
The results from Study 1 provide striking empirical support for Hypotheses 1 and 
2.10 As expected, participants identified the social policy candidate most strongly with his 
appropriate ideological label, and this finding holds only for participants reading about a 
candidate emphasizing social policies closely associated with religious values. Table I 
details participants’ ideological perceptions of each candidate, using the scale placement 
and forced choice ideology measures and comparing results from the full sample with 
those from the two social policy candidate conditions.  
[Insert Table I here] 
                                                 
10 All analyses presented in this paper are conducted using STATA Version 9. 
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Table I’s first column presents the mean ideological scale placement of each 
candidate, standardized to range from low to high ideological extremity.11 The social 
policy candidate’s mean scale placement is higher than that of the economic or foreign 
policy candidates, and in both cases the differences are statistically significant, according 
to difference of means tests.  
However, these differences are not apparent in both social policy conditions. The 
three candidates’ mean ideological scale placements do not differ significantly at any 
point in the secular social policy condition, ranging only between 5.00 and 5.18 on the 1-
7 scale. In stark contrast, participants assigned to the religious social policy condition 
place the social policy candidate significantly higher on the ideological scale than the 
economic and foreign policy candidates: 1.30 higher than the former and 1.01 higher than 
the latter, on average. Clearly, participants’ ideological perceptions of the social policy 
candidate differ substantially depending on whether that candidate associated himself 
with religious versus secular social policies. Moreover, the differences in ideological 
perception are entirely consistent with Hypothesis 2.   
                                                 
11 Specifically, scale placements ranged from –1 (least congruent with the candidate’s 
appropriate ideological label) to +1 (most congruent with the candidate’s appropriate 
ideological label). Thus, candidates in the liberal candidates condition are coded +1 if 
participants place them at the “extremely liberal” position on the ideological scale and  
–1 if participants place them at the “extremely conservative” position. Likewise, 
candidates in the conservative condition are coded +1 if participants label them 
“extremely conservative” and –1 if participants label them “extremely liberal.”   
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For the forced choice ideology measure, candidates are labeled most ideologically 
extreme if participants select them as the most liberal candidate in the liberal candidates 
condition or the most conservative candidate in the conservative candidates condition. 
Table I’s second column shows that a majority of participants judge the social policy 
candidate most ideologically extreme according to this measure. Fifty-seven percent of 
participants in the full sample select the social policy candidate as most ideologically 
extreme, a percentage that is significantly different from that selecting the economic or 
foreign policy candidates as most extreme, according to difference of proportions tests.  
When comparing candidates in the secular and religious social policy conditions, 
the results of the forced choice measure closely mirror those of the scale placement 
measure. Participants are about equally likely to select any of the three candidates as 
most ideologically extreme in the secular social policy condition, and these proportions 
are not significantly different in any case. In contrast, participants are overwhelmingly 
likely to select the social policy candidate as most ideologically extreme in the religious 
social policy condition. More than three-quarters of participants, 77%, select the religious 
social policy candidate as most ideologically extreme in this condition, a proportion 
significantly greater than that selecting the economic or foreign policy candidate as most 
ideologically extreme. Once more, these results show clearly that participants perceive 
the social policy candidate’s ideology quite differently depending on whether he 
emphasizes religious versus secular social policies, and these differences are entirely 
consistent with Hypothesis 2. The social policy dimension, as it is typically 
conceptualized, therefore seems to conflate two empirically distinct policy dimensions 
that have very different implications for ideological evaluation.  
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While Study 1 provides very clear support for Hypotheses 1 and 2, the evidence 
regarding Hypothesis 3 is somewhat mixed. According to Hypothesis 3, the same criterial 
referents, in this case policy dimensions, should primarily define liberalism and 
conservatism. Indeed, a majority of participants select the social policy candidate as most 
conservative in the conservative candidates condition (52%) and most liberal in the 
liberal candidates condition (62%). The difference in percentages is not statistically 
significant according to one-way ANOVA analysis, F (1, 110) = 1.24, p = 0.267. Thus, it 
appears that the same criterial referent most commonly defines liberalism and 
conservatism: the social policy dimension.  
However, Study 1’s results also indicate that the two other policy dimensions vary 
in terms of their relevance to ideological labeling; economic policy defines liberalism 
more than conservatism, and foreign policy defines conservatism more than liberalism. 
The percentage of participants selecting the economic policy candidate as most liberal in 
the liberal candidates condition (28%) is significantly higher than the percentage 
selecting him as most conservative in the conservative candidates condition (12%), F (1, 
110) = 4.70, p = 0.032. Likewise, the percentage of participants selecting the foreign 
policy candidate as most conservative in the conservative candidates condition (36%) is 
significantly higher than the percentage selecting him as most liberal in the liberal 
candidates condition (9%), F (1, 110) = 12.07, p = 0.001. There is some evidence, then, 
that certain policy dimensions are more relevant in defining one ideological label than 
another. However, the social policy dimension most defines ideological labels in general, 
according to this analysis, and it is not significantly more or less relevant in defining 
liberalism versus conservatism.  
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Study 1 provides valuable evidence supporting Hypotheses 1-3. In particular, this 
evidence indicates that social issues closely associated with religious values most 
influence conceptualizations of liberalism and conservatism, despite the fact that those 
issues invert traditional ideological preferences on the appropriate size and role of 
government. These findings are striking, but further analysis is needed in order to 
comprehensively evaluate this paper’s hypotheses.  
For Study 2, I conducted an experiment capable of validating and expanding upon 
Study 1’s findings. Having established the conceptual and empirical distinctiveness of the 
religious and secular social policy dimensions, in Study 2 I presented each participant 
with candidates representing all four major policy dimensions. Eliminating the social 
policy manipulation and increasing the sample size for Study 2 allows me to test with 
appropriate statistical power the hypothesized causal mechanism for conceptualizing 
ideological labels primarily in terms of religious social policy: authoritarianism.  
Experimental Design: Study 2 
 Study 2 participants were presented with a hypothetical election scenario closely 
mirroring that of Study 1, but differing in two important respects. First, if it were the 
case, as I expected, that Study 1 participants responded differently to the religious and 
secular social policy candidates by providing statistically distinguishable evaluations of 
those candidates’ ideologies, this would indicate that Study 1 participants were not being 
presented with the full range of policy dimensions relevant to ideological 
conceptualization. Therefore, to provide a more rigorous test of Hypothesis 2, including 
all four policy dimensions and directly comparing religious and secular social policy’s 
effects on ideological conceptualization, Study 2 presented participants with a 
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hypothetical election scenario featuring four candidates, each representing a distinct 
policy dimension: economic, foreign, secular social, or religious social policy. 
Second, I modified several descriptions of the candidates’ policy stances from 
Study 1, for the purpose of enhancing Study 2’s external validity. In several cases, the 
language used to describe the candidates’ positions was modified to more realistically 
represent the positions taken by real-world candidates, while in some cases new, more 
salient issues replaced less salient issues used in Study 1.12 
Study 2 uses a single-factor between-subjects design, with two conditions; 
specifically, participants were randomly assigned to read about an election featuring 
either four liberal candidates or four conservative candidates. Retaining this manipulation 
from Study 1 was crucial to providing the most rigorous test of Hypothesis 3. In 
particular, the fact that Study 2 includes four policy dimensions relevant to ideological 
conceptualization increases the chances that participants would use different criterial 
referents to define liberalism and conservatism. 
To test Hypothesis 4, I also included in Study 2 a series of questions measuring 
authoritarianism and other factors likely to influence the relationship between policy 
dimensions and evaluations of candidate ideology. In this section, I analyze the results of 
a logistic regression model predicting whether participants selected the religious social 
policy candidate (coded one) or any of the other three candidates (coded zero) as most 
ideologically extreme. Authoritarianism is the key independent variable in this model, 
and I also control for several relevant demographic and political variables.   
                                                 
12 Again, this paper’s appendix includes the exact positions attributed to each candidate. 
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Authoritarianism is measured using the standard four-item battery of child rearing 
values included in the ANES and most authoritarianism studies (e.g. Hetherington and 
Weiler 2009), which requires participants to choose whether an authoritarian or non-
authoritarian value is more important for raising children (e.g. obedience versus 
curiosity). Preference for each authoritarian value is coded one and preference for each 
non-authoritarian value is coded zero. Scores are summed to create a multi-item measure 
of authoritarianism ranging from 0 to 4, and then standardized to range from –1 to +1 so 
that authoritarianism’s effects can be directly compared to those of other significant 
variables included in the logistic regression model. 
Political control variables include party identification and ideological self-
placement, each measured with the standard seven-point scales used in the ANES and 
throughout the Political Science literature. Controlling for party identification and 
ideology is particularly relevant because there is evidence that political groups differ in 
the way that they conceptualize ideological labels (see Conover and Feldman 1981).    
Demographic control variables include participants’ gender, race/ethnicity, and 
religiosity.13 Each of these characteristics reasonably could be expected to influence 
ideological conceptualizations, due to the exceptional importance of some policy 
dimensions to specific groups of people. For instance, abortion policy’s particular 
relevance to women and religious participants might lead them to define ideological 
labels primarily in terms of the religious social policy dimension, and Affirmative 
                                                 
13 Please see this paper’s appendix for a detailed explanation of how these and other 
variables described in this section are coded. 
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Action’s particular relevance to racial and ethnic minorities might lead those participants 
to define ideology primary in terms of secular social policy. 
Finally, since previous research indicates that ideological comprehension varies 
with sophistication levels (e.g. Knight 1985), participants report their education level and 
answer several questions measuring their political knowledge. 
Results: Study 2 
One hundred thirty-four undergraduate students from [deleted for anonymity] 
University participated in Study 2, in Winter 2009, in exchange for extra credit points in 
a Political Science course. Fifty-nine percent of participants were males, 18% were non-
whites, 49% were Democrats, 49% were liberals, 19% were Political Science majors, and 
ages ranged from 18 to 54 years old (with a mean of 21).   
Study 2’s results provide additional support for Hypothesis 2.14 Once again, 
participants identify the religious social policy candidate most strongly with his 
appropriate ideological label, across both measures of candidate ideology. Table II’s first 
column shows that the mean ideological scale placement of the religious social policy 
candidate is higher than that of any other candidate, and it is significantly different from 
the secular social policy and foreign policy candidates’ mean placements. It is higher, but 
not significantly different, from that of the economic policy candidate, however.  
[Insert Table II here] 
Table II’s second column shows that a plurality of participants identifies the 
religious social policy candidate as most ideologically extreme in the forced choice 
                                                 
14 Since Study 2 presented all participants with a religious social policy candidate and a 
secular social policy candidate, its results cannot be used to test Hypothesis 1 directly. 
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measure. Although the 38% of participants identifying him as such is a far cry from the 
77% of participants doing so in Study 1, this percentage is significantly different from 
each of the other candidates’ percentages.  
These results further indicate that ideological labels tend to be defined primarily 
in terms of religious social policy. However, they are not as robust as the results from 
Study 1. What could account for the differences? First, Study 2 presented participants 
with one more candidate than in Study 1, thereby increasing each candidate’s probability 
of being identified as most ideologically extreme in Study 2, by random chance alone. To 
the extent that any participants identify a candidate as most ideologically extreme by 
random chance alone, the percentages for each candidate should be lower in Study 2. 
Second, the economic recession that materialized between Study 1 (June/July 
2008) and Study 2 (March 2009) undoubtedly made economic policies much more salient 
to participants in the latter study. As a result of this dramatic change in participants’ 
political environment, it should come as no surprise that the percentage of Study 2 
participants defining ideological labels primarily in terms of economic policy was higher 
than in Study 1, and that this helped to decrease the percentage of Study 2 participants 
defining ideological labels primarily in terms of religious social policy. Actually, what 
seems most surprising about these results is that a plurality of participants still defined 
liberalism and conservatism primarily in terms of social policy, even in the face of a 
severe economic recession and a surge in the salience of economic policy.  
Study 2’s results also provide strong support for Hypothesis 3, which states that 
the same criterial referents, or policy dimensions, primarily define liberalism and 
conservatism. Once more, a majority of participants select the religious social policy 
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candidate as most conservative in the conservative candidates condition (42%) and most 
liberal in the liberal candidates condition (34%), and the difference in percentages is not 
statistically significant, F (1, 133) = 0.88, p = 0.354. Unlike Study 1, however, there is no 
significant difference in the percentage of other candidates selected as most ideologically 
extreme in the liberal versus conservative candidate conditions. Thus, there is no 
evidence in Study 2 that different criterial referents primarily define liberalism and 
conservatism. The religious social policy candidate is most closely identified with both 
ideological labels, and the proportion of participants identifying him as such does not 
differ significantly when evaluating liberal versus conservative candidates.  
The preceding evidence strongly supports my hypothesis that religious social 
policy most defines the liberal and conservative ideological labels. However, to this point 
it is not clear why individuals tend to conceptualize ideological labels in this way, and 
previous studies of ideological conceptualization offer little explanatory guidance. Table 
III presents the results of a logistic regression model predicting whether Study 2 
participants identify the religious social policy candidate, or one of the other candidates, 
as most ideologically extreme (e.g. most conservative in the conservative candidates 
condition, or most liberal in the liberal candidates condition). As detailed above, the 
authoritarianism literature and the nature of the religious social policy dimension lead me 
to expect that more authoritarian individuals are significantly more likely to define 
ideological labels primarily in terms of religious social policy, even when controlling for 
the candidate ideology manipulation and relevant political and demographic factors.  
[Insert Table III here] 
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The results presented in Table III provide strong support for authoritarianism’s 
hypothesized causal role in shaping ideological conceptualization. The authoritarianism 
variable is statistically significant (p-value = 0.014), and it is positively signed. Thus, 
more authoritarian participants prove significantly more likely to identify the religious 
social policy candidate as the most conservative candidate in the conservative candidates 
condition or the most liberal candidate in the liberal candidates condition. What is more, 
none of the other variables in this model reach, or even approach, statistical significance. 
Most notably, the candidate ideology manipulation is not significant, and this provides 
additional support for Hypothesis 3.  
To further explicate authoritarianism’s role in shaping ideological 
conceptualization, Table IV presents the predicted probabilities of Study 2 participants 
identifying the religious social policy candidate as most ideologically extreme, at each 
level of authoritarianism. Holding all other model covariates at their mean values, the 
predicted probability of selecting the religious social policy candidate as most 
ideologically extreme increases in a sharp linear pattern, ranging from 0.14 for the least 
authoritarian participants to 0.61 for the most authoritarian participants.  
[Insert Table IV here] 
The results presented in Table III and Table IV provide strong evidence for the 
hypothesized causal role of authoritarianism in shaping ideological conceptualization. 
Even when controlling for religiosity, political knowledge, and other factors relevant to 
ideological evaluation and religious social policy, the most authoritarian participants have 
a greater than 60% probability of identifying the religious social policy candidate as most 
ideologically extreme among a field of four candidates. Considering these impressive 
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results, there is ample reason to believe that psychological factors contribute critically to 
the process of ideological conceptualization and evaluation. In particular, more 
authoritarian participants are significantly more likely to define ideological labels 
primarily in terms of the religious social policy dimension. This relationship, I argue, is 
attributable to the congruence between authoritarian worldviews and the exceptionally 
value-laden nature of debate over religious social policies such as abortion, gay marriage, 
and school prayer, each of which typically evoke deep-seated values that are 
exceptionally resistant to influence from new information and competing viewpoints.  
Discussion 
This paper’s findings have important implications for the study of ideology and 
authoritarianism. First, they indicate that traditional explanations of the distinction 
between liberalism and conservatism are incomplete and, in important ways, misguided. 
For many issues, such as abortion, gay marriage, and school prayer, liberals typically 
prefer government restraint and conservatives typically prefer government intervention. 
Remarkably, these positions, which are least consistent with traditional definitions of 
liberalism and conservatism, appear to exert the greatest influence over how individuals 
conceptualize ideological labels. As a result, I would argue that ideological differences no 
longer should be defined exclusively, or even primarily, in terms of attitudes toward the 
appropriate size and role of government. Instead, scholars should use a more nuanced 
definition of liberalism and conservatism, one that is capable of capturing more 
completely the range of issues and policy dimensions associated with these labels.  
Second, typical characterizations of the social policy dimension appear, on logical 
and empirical grounds, to conflate two distinct sets of policies. Conceptually, social 
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policies can be distinguished on the basis of their association with religious values as well 
as their implications for government intervention. Empirically, Study 1 and Study 2 
participants treat the religious and secular social policy dimensions as distinct, and the 
former is far more powerful in shaping conceptualizations of ideological labels.  
Third, these studies provide little evidence to suggest that different policy 
dimensions most influence participants’ conceptualizations of liberalism and 
conservatism. This finding is inconsistent with previous research indicating that 
individuals use different criterial referents to define ideological labels.  
Finally, the finding that authoritarianism motivates individuals’ tendency to 
conceptualize ideological labels primarily in terms of religious social policy recommends 
serious consideration of the argument presented by Hetherington and Weiler (2009) that 
an authoritarian-based worldview evolution now structures U.S. political competition. A 
promising avenue for future research would be to replicate this paper’s experimental 
design while introducing a candidate representing the authoritarianism policy dimension, 
as defined by Hetherington and Weiler, to see whether participants, particularly 
authoritarians, define ideological labels primarily in terms of this dimension. Also, 
additional studies would be useful in identifying other psychological or personality 
factors potentially influencing conceptualizations and applications of ideological labels. 
While the evidence supporting this paper’s hypotheses is strong in many respects, 
due caution is in order. Given that I tested the hypotheses using data from non-
representative, university undergraduate samples, some might argue it is inappropriate to 
draw generalized conclusions about ideological conceptualization throughout the public 
from these results (see Sears 1986), for two important reasons. First, by definition, 
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college students are well-educated and therefore more likely than the general public to 
understand ideological concepts (see Knight 1985). Therefore, students’ evaluations of 
ideological labels might differ in important ways from typical members of the general 
public. While such differences are quite plausible, the experimental data suggest that they 
are unlikely. Political sophisticates are no more or less likely than non-sophisticates to 
identify the religious social policy candidate as most ideologically extreme in Study 1, F 
(1, 110) = 0.00, p = 0.950, or in Study 2, F(1, 132) = 0.15, p = 0.702. Also, Political 
Science majors are no more or less likely than non-majors to identify the religious social 
policy candidate as most ideologically extreme in Study 1, F (1, 110) = 0.71, p = 0.400, 
or in Study 2, F (1, 133) = 0.72, p = 0.398. 
A second cause for concern in using an undergraduate sample for this analysis is 
that college students have a reputation for being more socially liberal than the general 
public. To the extent that this reputation is justified, participants might be more likely to 
define ideological labels primarily in terms of religious social policy because they have 
especially strong and distinctive views on those issues. Again, this argument is quite 
plausible, but the evidence does not suggest that it poses a significant threat to the 
generalizability of my findings.  
Study 1 and Study 2 included several questions pertaining to participants’ views 
on the policies associated with each candidate. Using gay marriage as an example, 41% 
of Study 1 participants agree with the statement that “Homosexual marriage should be 
legal everywhere in the United States” and 43% of Study 2 participants agree with the 
statement that “The federal government should recognize same-sex marriage as a 
constitutional right of all Americans.” These percentages are similar to the 37.5% of 2008 
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ANES respondents saying gay marriage should be allowed in the United States, and the 
40% of 2009 Gallup respondents saying likewise.15 Also, 13% of Study 1 participants 
and 7% of Study 2 participants say the issue of gay marriage is “Extremely Important” to 
them, personally, while 23% and 28%, respectively, say the issue is “Very Important.” 
Thus, while participants differ from the general public in their views on religious social 
policy, participants do not regard such issues as exceptionally important and their 
differences from the general public do not appear dramatic enough to significantly 
threaten the generalizability of my findings. 
Whatever its potential limitations, this paper contributes importantly to scholars’ 
understanding of ideological conceptualization. First, after years of this topic receiving 
little attention, this paper provides an updated analysis of ideological labeling capable of 
capturing significant changes in the political environment and the public’s understanding 
of ideological concepts during the intervening period.  
Second, the finding that religious social policy most influences ideological 
conceptualizations undermines the traditional depiction of orientations toward 
government activity as central to defining liberalism and conservatism. Also, since the 
issues comprising the religious social policy dimension emerged only in the last four 
decades, this finding indicates that conceptualizations of ideological labels have changed 
substantially over time, and that they may change again in the future.  
                                                 
15 Retrieved December 10, 2010, from http://www.gallup.com/poll/118378/majority-
americans-continue-oppose-gay-marriage.aspx.  
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Third, the finding that religious and secular social policies have distinct empirical, 
as well as conceptual, implications for ideological conceptualization, argues for treating 
them as separate policy dimensions, rather than components of one coherent dimension.  
Finally, this paper provides unique insights into authoritarianism’s role in shaping 
conceptualizations and applications of ideological labels. Whereas previous studies 
provide little guidance with respect to psychological factors’ effects on ideological 
conceptualization, this analysis demonstrates that more authoritarian participants are 
significantly more likely to define ideological labels primarily in terms of the religious 
social policy dimension. In addition to improving political scientists’ understanding of 
ideological conceptualization and its psychological determinants, this paper adds to a 
growing body of literature detailing authoritarianism’s profound relevance to a variety of 
political behaviors and attitudes. Specifically in terms of ideology, previous studies show 
that authoritarianism significantly influences ideological self-identification. The analyses 
presented in this paper indicate that authoritarianism also plays a critical role in shaping 
the way that individuals conceptualize ideological labels and evaluate candidate ideology. 
Given ideology’s tremendous theoretical and empirical significance within the political 
behavior literature, these findings should only encourage scholars to further investigate 
the importance of psychological factors, and authoritarianism in particular, in shaping 
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Appendix 
Study 1 Stimulus (Liberal Candidates Condition): 
- John Samuels supports the following policies: Substantially increasing taxes on 
businesses and individuals at most income levels; Sharply increasing government 
spending on programs such as unemployment and poverty assistance; giving 
employees much greater legal ability to form and join labor unions. 
- Tom Bryant supports the following policies: Sharply decreasing military defense 
funding, particularly for the purpose of producing military weaponry; Forbidding 
the federal government from electronically monitoring telephone calls placed to 
U.S. citizens by suspected foreign terrorists; Committing the U.S. to greater levels 
of cooperation with the United Nations and other international institutions, as a 
way of responding to their recent disagreements over U.S. foreign policy. 
- [Secular social candidate condition only] Rick Phillips supports the following 
policies: Providing all persons found to have immigrated to the United States 
illegally with the opportunity to obtain U.S. citizenship status; Enacting greater 
legal restrictions on individuals’ ability to purchase and carry handguns; 
Expanding Affirmative Action programs for all federally funded agencies and 
institutions. 
- [Religious social candidate condition only] Rick Phillips supports the following 
policies: Overturning federal laws that prevent homosexuals from getting 
married; Increasing women’s access to legal abortions at all stages of pregnancy; 
Forbidding students from participating openly in prayer on public school grounds.  
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Study 1 Stimulus (Conservative Candidates Condition): 
- John Samuels supports the following policies: Providing large tax cuts to 
businesses and individuals at all income levels; Sharply reducing government 
spending on programs such as unemployment and poverty assistance; Giving 
employers greater legal ability to discourage their employees from joining labor 
unions.  
- Tom Bryant supports the following policies: Sharply increasing military defense 
funding, particularly for the purpose of producing military weaponry; Renewing 
legislation allowing the federal government to electronically monitor telephone 
calls placed to U.S. citizens by suspected foreign terrorists; Committing the U.S. 
to greater levels of independence from the United Nations and other international 
institutions, as a way of responding to their recent disagreements over U.S. 
foreign policy. 
- [Secular social candidate condition only] Rick Phillips supports the following 
policies: Arresting and deporting all persons found to have immigrated to the 
United States illegally; Greatly easing legal restrictions on individuals’ ability to 
purchase and carry handguns; Eliminating Affirmative Action programs for all 
federally funded agencies and institutions.  
- [Religious social candidate condition only] Rick Phillips supports the following 
policies: Passing a Constitutional amendment banning homosexual marriage 
throughout the United States; Legally restricting women’s access to abortions at 
all stages of pregnancy; Requiring public schools to allow time each day for 
students to participate openly in prayer.  
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Study 2 Stimulus (Liberal Candidates Condition): 
- John Samuels supports the following policies: Increasing taxes on corporations 
and individuals earning $100,000 or more in annual income; Sharply increasing 
the number of government programs aimed at providing financial aid to low-
income people; Requiring the federal government to provide health insurance 
coverage for all Americans, even if that means restricting individuals’ ability to 
choose between private insurance plans. 
- Rick Phillips supports the following policies: Overturning federal laws aimed at 
discouraging same-sex marriage; Easing legal restrictions affecting women’s 
access to abortion at all stages of pregnancy; Forbidding students from engaging 
openly in prayer on public school grounds. 
- Tom Bryant supports the following policies: Decreasing the number of U.S. 
military personnel by 50%; Forbidding the federal government from monitoring 
the telephone calls of U.S. citizens suspected of involvement in terrorist activities; 
Increasing the United States’ involvement in international diplomatic 
organizations such as the United Nations. 
- William Crane supports the following policies: Providing citizenship status and 
government services to illegal immigrants already living in the United States; 
Increasing legal restrictions on individuals’ ability to purchase and carry 
handguns; Expanding the use of Affirmative Action hiring practices for all 




Study 2 Stimulus (Conservative Candidates Condition): 
- John Samuels supports the following policies: Cutting taxes for corporations and 
individuals at all income levels; Sharply reducing the number of government 
programs aimed at providing financial aid to low-income people; Allowing 
individuals the freedom to purchase their own health insurance coverage, even if 
that means individuals who cannot afford coverage will go uninsured. 
- Rick Phillips supports the following policies: Passing a Constitutional amendment 
to ban same-sex marriage; Legally restricting women’s access to abortion at all 
stages of pregnancy; Requiring public schools to allow time each day for students 
to engage openly in prayer. 
- Tom Bryant supports the following policies: Increasing the number of U.S. 
military personnel by 50%; Allowing the federal government to monitor the 
telephone calls of U.S. citizens suspected of involvement in terrorist activities; 
Reducing the United States’ involvement in international diplomatic organizations 
such as the United Nations. 
- William Crane supports the following policies: Arresting and deporting all illegal 
immigrants; Easing legal restrictions on individuals’ ability to purchase and carry 
handguns; Ending the use of Affirmative Action hiring practices for all federally 






Candidate ideology: Scale placement: “Where would you place [candidate name] on the 
ideological scale below?” Very liberal (1), Somewhat liberal (2), Slightly liberal  
(3), Neither conservative nor liberal (4), Slightly conservative (5), Somewhat 
conservative (6), Very conservative (7). Candidate placements are reverse-coded for 
participants in the liberal candidates condition, so that candidate placements ranged from 
least (1) to most (7) congruent with the candidates’ appropriate ideological label. Forced 
choice: “Now, which candidate would you say is the most politically liberal 
(conservative)?” The most liberal (conservative) candidate in the liberal (conservative) 
candidates condition is coded 1, and all other candidates are coded zero.  
 
Religiosity: Religious attendance: Never (-1), Rarely (-0.33), Once a month (0.33), Once 
a week or More than once a week (1). Religious importance: Not important (-1), A little 
important (-0.5), Somewhat important (0), Very important (0.5), Extremely important (1). 
Scores are summed and then divided by two to create a religiosity index. 
  
Education: College freshman (-1), sophomore (-0.33), junior (0.33), senior or other (1).  
 
Political knowledge: 1) Vice President’s name; 2) Proportion of the House and Senate 
needed to override a presidential veto; 3) Majority party in the U.S. House; 4) More 
conservative party; 5) Government branch that determines laws’ constitutionality; 6) U.S. 
House Speaker’s name; 7) U.S. Chief Justice’s name; 8) U.S. Senate Majority Leader’s 
name; 9) U.S. Senate Minority Leader’s name. Responses are scored as correct (1) or 




TABLE I                    Study 1: Perceived Ideological Extremity of the Candidates 
                                                                 Descriptive Statistics 
 Mean Ideological  Forced Choice of 
Candidate Scale Placement Most Extreme Candidate 
Full Sample   
Economic Policy Candidate 4.86a 22d 
   (0.148) 19.8% 
Foreign Policy Candidate 4.94a 26d 
   (0.151) 23.4% 
Social Policy Candidate 5.44 63 
   (0.136) 56.8% 
N 116 111 
Secular Social Policy Condition   
Economic Policy Candidate 5.18b 16e 
   (0.192) 29.1% 
Foreign Policy Candidate 5.04b 19e 
   (0.200) 34.6% 
Social Policy Candidate 5.00b 20e 
   (0.175) 36.4% 
N 57 55 
Religious Social Policy Condition   
Economic Policy Candidate 4.56c 6f 
   (0.219) 10.7% 
Foreign Policy Candidate 4.85c 7f 
   (0.227) 12.5% 
Social Policy Candidate 5.86 43 
   (0.193) 76.8% 
N 59 56 
Mean ideological scale placements are normalized to range from 1, very conservative (very 
liberal) in the liberal (conservative) candidates condition, to 7, very liberal (very conservative) in 
the liberal (conservative) candidates condition. Standard errors are in parentheses. 
 
Forced choice statistics reflect the number and percentage of participants identifying that 
candidate as the most liberal (conservative) candidate in the liberal (conservative) candidates 
condition. 
 
Note: Means and proportions not sharing the same superscript significantly differ from each 
other at the .05 significance level, according to difference of means and difference of proportion 
tests, respectively.  
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TABLE II                   Study 2: Perceived Ideological Extremity of the Candidates 
                                                                 Descriptive Statistics 
      
 Mean Ideological  Forced Choice of 
Candidate Scale Placement Most Extreme Candidate 
Economic Policy Candidate 5.17ab 35c 
   (0.136) 26.1% 
Foreign Policy Candidate 4.90a 19c 
   (0.133) 14.2% 
Secular Social Policy Candidate 4.90a 29c 
   (0.149) 21.6% 
Religious Social Policy Candidate 5.37b 51 
   (0.136) 38.1% 
N 134 134 
Mean ideological scale placements are normalized to range from 1, very conservative (very liberal) 
in the liberal (conservative) candidates condition, to 7, very liberal (very conservative) in the 
liberal (conservative) candidates condition. Standard errors are in parentheses. 
 
Forced choice statistics reflect the number and percentage of participants identifying that 
candidate as the most liberal (conservative) candidate in the liberal (conservative) candidates 
condition.  
 
Note: Means and proportions not sharing the same superscript significantly differ from each 























TABLE III    Predicting Selection of the Most Ideologically Extreme Candidate  
                                               Logistic Regression Estimates 
  
      Selection: Religious  
Parameter Social Policy Candidate 
Candidate Ideology Manipulation 0.194 
   (0.190) 
Party Identification -0.275 
   (0.354)  
Ideological Self-Placement -0.435 
   (0.424) 
Religiosity 0.241 
   (0.354) 
Minority -0.336 
   (0.283) 
Female 0.272 
   (0.222) 
Education 0.296 
   (0.259) 
Political Knowledge 0.684 
   (0.492) 
Authoritarianism 1.142* 
   (0.465) 
Constant -0.865 




Note: Entries are logistic regression coefficients, and standard errors are in parentheses. 
*Significant at the .05 confidence level. 
    
For ease of interpretation, each variable has been standardized to range from -1 to +1.  
    
The dependent variable represents whether participants select the religious social policy 
candidate as most liberal (conservative) in the liberal (conservative) candidates 
condition. It is coded 1 if participants select the religious social policy candidate as most 
ideologically extreme, and 0 if participants select the economic, foreign, or secular social 







TABLE IV       Predicted Probabilities of Selecting the Religious Social Policy    
                       Candidate as Most Ideologically Extreme, by Authoritarianism 
        
Preferred Authoritarian Values Predicted Probability 
0 0.139 
    
1 0.222 
    
2 0.335 
    
3 0.472 
    
4 0.612 
    
Note: Entries are predicted probabilities of selecting the religious social policy 
candidate as the most liberal (conservative) candidate in the liberal (conservative) 
candidates condition.  
    
Authoritarianism is measured as the number of authoritarian, versus non-
authoritarian, child-rearing values preferred by a participant. Authoritarian values 
include: respect for elders, over independence; obedience, over self-reliance; good 
manners, over curiosity; being well-behaved, over being considerate.  
 
All Table III model covariates, except for authoritarianism, are held at their mean 
values in this analysis.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
